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BAREFOOT IN QUICKSAND: THE FUTURE OF “FUTURE
DANGEROUSNESS” PREDICTIONS IN DEATH PENALTY
SENTENCING IN THE WORLD OF DAUBERT AND KUMHO
Thomas Regnier*
It is my opinion that such future-telling is admissible under no theory
of law and prejudicial beyond belief . . . .†
—Judge Wendell A. Odom
[P]sychiatric predictions based on hypothetical situations sometimes
bear more resemblance to medieval fortune-telling than to modern
scientific techniques.‡
—Texas Defender Service

Shortly after midnight on October 24, 1984, Thomas Barefoot was
executed by lethal injection in Huntsville, Texas,1 for the murder of a
policeman.2 While it may not be surprising that Barefoot would be put to
death for this crime, what is disturbing is the way the state of Texas
arrived at the decision to execute Barefoot rather than sentence him to
life in prison. Under Texas sentencing procedures, a convicted murderer
could be put to death only if a jury found that he was likely to be

*

Thomas Regnier (J.D., University of Miami, summa cum laude; B.A., Trinity College, Phi
Beta Kappa) is a Judicial Law Clerk to the Hon. Melvia B. Green, Florida Third District Court of
Appeal, and a Lecturer at University of Miami School of Law. The author thanks Professor Susan
Haack for her comments and guidance.
†
State v. Smith, 534 S.W.2d 900, 905 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (Odom, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
‡
TEXAS DEFENDER SERVICE, A STATE OF DENIAL: TEXAS JUSTICE AND THE DEATH
PENALTY 45 (as modified May 22, 2003), available at http://www.texasdefender.org/state%20of%
20denial/Chap3.pdf.
1. PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 220 (1991).
2. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 883 (1983) (holding psychiatric predictions of future
dangerousness admissible in death penalty sentencing), superseded on other grounds by statute, as
stated in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 480-81 (2000).
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dangerous in the future.3 In other words, Barefoot’s death sentence was
based, not only on an act he had done in the past, but on acts that the
jury anticipated he might do in the future. In addition, the jury’s decision
was partially based on predictions, made by two psychiatrists, that
Barefoot would be dangerous in the future, in spite of the fact that the
American Psychiatric Association disclaims such predictions, admitting
that they are wrong twice as often as they are right.4 Finally, and this
fact is perhaps most disturbing of all, the entire process received the seal
of approval of the U.S. Supreme Court.5
To understand the Barefoot decision, it is necessary to examine
Jurek v. Texas,6 an earlier case in which the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of using predictions of future dangerousness as an
element in capital sentencing.7 I will begin by analyzing the background
to Barefoot, and then the Barefoot case itself. I will consider how
admissibility of future dangerousness testimony in capital cases may or
may not have changed after the Supreme Court’s decisions in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals8 and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.9 I
will argue that future dangerousness predictions in capital cases are an
unconstitutional due process violation, and that they violate evidentiary
principles requiring reliability and excluding evidence that is
substantially misleading or prejudicial. Finally, I will argue that we must
re-think the Daubert/Kumho test for admissibility of expert testimony so
as to preserve the insights of the Frye v. United States10 test and ensure
that reliability becomes the keynote in both scientific and technical
testimony.
I. BEFORE BAREFOOT: JUREK PARK
The law regarding the death penalty in the United States changed
dramatically in 1972 with the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in
Furman v. Georgia.11 In a five-to-four decision, the Court effectively
struck down the death penalty procedures then in existence in the United

3. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon 1981).
4. Brief for American Psychiatric Association, as Amicus Curiae, at 9, Barefoot v. Estelle,
463 U.S. 880 (1983) (No. 82-6080) [hereinafter APA Brief].
5. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 905.
6. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
7. Id. at 276.
8. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
9. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
10. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
11. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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States.12 The Court’s rationale was difficult to discern, however, as each
of the five justices in the majority wrote his own opinion.13 Justices
Brennan14 and Marshall15 argued that the death penalty was
unconstitutional in all circumstances, as a violation of the Eighth
Amendment’s ban on “cruel and unusual punishments.”16 They
interpreted “cruel and unusual” through the lens of “evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society”17 and found
that the death penalty served no legitimate retributive or deterrent
function.18
Justices Douglas,19 Stewart,20 and White21 found that the death
penalty violated the Eighth Amendment because it was administered
with such a wide range of discretion that the results were arbitrary and
unpredictable.22 They were disturbed by the disproportionate application
of the death penalty based on racial factors.23
The upshot was that the states could administer the death penalty
only if they were able to devise new death penalty schemes that guided a
jury’s discretion in such a way as to remove the arbitrary and
discriminatory effects that the Court had disapproved.24
After Furman, about three-fourths of the states enacted new death
penalty laws.25 Some states solved the problem of rampant jury
discretion by simply requiring mandatory death sentences for particular
types of crimes.26 Most states, however, adopted “guided discretion”
statutes.27 In these schemes, a separate sentencing hearing, or “penalty
phase,” takes place after the defendant is found guilty of first degree
murder.28 The sentencer (usually the jury) chooses either the death
penalty or life in prison (with or without the possibility of parole) based
12. JOHN KAPLAN, ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 512-13 (4th ed. 2000).
13. Furman, 408 U.S. at 240.
14. Id. at 305-06 (Brennan, J., concurring).
15. Id. at 358-59 (Marshall, J., concurring).
16. “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
17. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion of Warren, C. J.).
18. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 301-05 (Brennan, J., concurring).
19. Id. at 249-57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
20. Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
21. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
22. See, e.g., id. at 249 (Douglas, J., concurring).
23. See id. at 249-50 (Douglas, J., concurring).
24. KAPLAN, supra note 12, at 513.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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on a balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors.29 This model has
become the norm for death penalty procedures in the United States.30
On July 2, 1976, the Supreme Court decided a set of five
companion cases considering the constitutionality of newly enacted
death penalty procedures in five states: Georgia, Florida, Texas, North
Carolina, and Louisiana. The North Carolina31 and Louisiana32 statutes,
which had revived the automatic death penalty for certain crimes, were
struck down. The Georgia,33 Texas,34 and Florida35 statutes, all of which
provided for guided discretion, were upheld. Although the Georgia
statute in Gregg received the most attention at the time, it is only the
Texas statute, upheld in Jurek, which is relevant to the issue of future
dangerousness. Texas is the only state that requires prediction of future
dangerousness to be considered in imposing the death penalty,36
although a few other states allow it to be considered as an aggravating
factor.37
Jerry Lane Jurek was convicted in Texas for the August 16, 1973,38
murder of a ten-year-old girl.39 The murder took place as part of the
kidnapping and attempted rape of the child.40 He was found guilty of
first degree murder and sentenced to death under two Texas statutes that
had been passed in response to Furman.41 Article 1257, Texas Penal
Code,42 defined the offense, and article 37.071, Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure,43 prescribed the punishment. Article 1257(b)(2) provided, in
part:
(b) The punishment for murder with malice aforethought shall be death
or imprisonment for life if: . . .

29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
32. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
33. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
34. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
35. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
36. Jurek v. Texas, 522 S.W.2d 934, 945 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (Odom, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); see also Guy Goldberg & Gena Blum, Balancing Fairness and Finality:
A Comprehensive Review of the Texas Death Penalty, 5 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 49, 128 (2000).
37. See Jonathan Simon & Christina Spaulding, Tokens of Our Esteem: Aggravating Factors
in the Era of Deregulated Death Penalties, in THE KILLING STATE 81, 105 (Austin Sarat ed., 1999).
38. Jurek, 522 S.W.2d at 937 n.1.
39. Id. at 936-37.
40. Id. at 937.
41. Id. at 938.
42. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1257 (Vernon 1973) (effective June 14, 1973).
43. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon 1973) (effective June 14, 1973).
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(2) the person intentionally committed the murder in the course of
committing or attempting to commit kidnapping, burglary,
robbery, forcible rape, or arson . . . .44

Article 37.071, delineating the sentencing phase of the proceedings,
provided:
(a) Upon a finding that the defendant is guilty of a capital offense, the
court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine
whether the defendant shall be sentenced to death or life imprisonment.
The proceeding shall be conducted in the trial court before the trial
jury as soon as practicable. In the proceeding, evidence may be
presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence.
This subsection may not be construed to authorize the introduction of
any evidence secured in violation of the Constitution of the United
States or of the State of Texas. The state and the defendant or his
counsel shall be permitted to present argument for or against the
sentence of death.
(b) On conclusion of the presentation of the evidence, the court shall
submit the following issues to the jury:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of
the deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable
expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat
to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant
in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the
provocation, if any, by the deceased.
(c) The state must prove each issue submitted beyond a reasonable
doubt, and the jury shall return a special verdict of “yes” or “no” on

44. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1257 (Vernon 1973). The statute defines four other categories
under which a person may be guilty of first degree murder:
(1) the person murdered a peace officer or fireman who was acting in the lawful
discharge of an official duty and who the defendant knew was a peace officer or fireman;
...
(3) the person committed the murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration or
employed another to commit the murder for remuneration or the promise of
remuneration;
(4) the person committed the murder while escaping or attempting to escape from a
penal institution;
(5) the person, while incarcerated in a penal institution, murdered another who was
employed in the operation of the penal institution.
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each issue submitted.
(d) The court shall charge the jury that:
(1) it may not answer any issue “yes” unless it agrees
unanimously; and
(2) it may not answer any issue “no” unless 10 or more jurors
agree.
(e) If the jury returns an affirmative finding on each issue submitted
under this article, the court shall sentence the defendant to death. If the
jury returns a negative finding on any issue submitted under this
article, the court shall sentence the defendant to confinement in the
Texas Department of Corrections for life.
(f) The judgment of conviction and sentence of death shall be subject
to automatic review by the Court of Criminal Appeals within 60 days
after certification by the sentencing court of the entire record unless
time is extended an additional period not to exceed 30 days by the
Court of Criminal Appeals for good cause shown. Such review by the
Court of Criminal Appeals shall have priority over all other cases, and
shall be heard in accordance with rules promulgated by the Court of
Criminal Appeals.45

When Jurek’s case reached the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals,46
the court upheld the statutory scheme as constitutional.47 The court
approved Article 1257 on the basis that it limited the circumstances
under which the state could seek the death penalty to a small group of
narrowly defined and especially brutal offenses.48 The court found
article 37.071 acceptable because, in response to Furman, it provided a
separate sentencing procedure and limited jury discretion.49 The court
found that the questions asked of the jury “channel the jury’s
consideration on punishment and effectively insure against the arbitrary
and wanton imposition of the death penalty.”50
The court next addressed Jurek’s argument that subsection (b)(2) of
article 37.071, the future dangerousness element, was too vague to
provide adequate guidance to the jury:51
[T]here are some factors which are readily apparent and are viable
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon 1973) (emphasis added).
Jurek, 522 S.W.2d at 934.
Id. at 940.
Id. at 939.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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factors for the jury’s consideration. In determining the likelihood that
the defendant would be a continuing threat to society, the jury could
consider whether the defendant had a significant criminal record. It
could consider the range and severity of his prior criminal conduct. It
could further look to the age of the defendant and whether or not at the
time of the commission of the offense he was acting under duress or
under the domination of another. It could also consider whether the
defendant was under an extreme form of mental or emotional pressure,
something less, perhaps, than insanity, but more than the emotions of
the average man, however inflamed, could withstand.52

Note that the court does not suggest, nor does it reject, enlisting
expert witnesses to help the jury determine a defendant’s future
dangerousness.
Judges Odom and Roberts, both dissenting at least in part, found
subsection (b)(2) problematically vague.53 The subsection says that the
jury must find whether there is a probability that the defendant would
commit criminal acts of violence.54 Subsection (c) requires, before
imposition of the death penalty, that the jury find this probability, as well
as the elements of subsections (b)(1) and (3) to exist beyond a
reasonable doubt.55 But what does this mean, to find that there is
“probability” that a person will commit acts of violence “beyond a
reasonable doubt?” What is meant by a probability beyond a reasonable
doubt? Does it mean that, beyond a reasonable doubt, there is some
probability? How much probability? Any probability?56 Judge Roberts
noted that this formula would have to be answered in the affirmative for
every individual because it is beyond a reasonable doubt that every
person has some probability (though admittedly it may be very small for
many of those people) that he or she will commit criminal acts of
violence at some time in the future.57 Presumably only the dead are
absolutely incapable of committing future acts of violence.
Judge Roberts considered the future dangerousness issue even more
deeply and stated:
I have other, graver reservations about subsection (b)(2). Under this
subsection we go beyond our traditional understanding of reasonable
doubt, which is based on the defensible premise that where acts have

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
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been performed, they can be proven to have produced an incident
beyond a reasonable doubt. This concept has been tried, tested, and
proven valid.
But under subsection (b)(2) the jury is required to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that an individual, the defendant, will in the future
perform certain acts. This adopts the principle of predestination: That
man is destined to do certain things and hence has no control over his
actions. If this be true, we should not punish or attempt to rehabilitate,
since the defendant is no more responsible for his acts than an
individual who is insane at the time he commits an offense.
However, if individuals are responsible for their acts—as I
believe—this cannot be true; yet if individuals are so responsible,
(b)(2) is unconstitutional, since it is impossible to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt or to a moral certainty that a person will act in a
certain manner in the future.58

Judge Roberts perhaps overstates the case when he speaks of
predestination: it is quite possible to find that certain events are highly
likely without finding that they are inevitable or predetermined.59
Nevertheless, Judge Roberts has here hit upon the mind-boggling flaw
that the majority overlooked: how can a legal system that prides itself on
due process make imposition of the death penalty, as opposed to life in
prison, turn on someone’s—anyone’s—speculation about what that
person will do in the future? Can we justifiably put someone to death for
a crime he has not yet committed? The Texas penalty procedure for
capital murder in effect says to the defendant: “Your past crimes have
earned you at least life in prison. We will now determine whether to put
you to death based on our predictions of your as-yet-uncommitted
crimes.”
This dilemma puts us at the crossroads of science and law. Faigman
notes that while law operates on the premise that people are responsible
for their actions, science assumes that people are affected by some
combination of their biology and their experiences.60 If we take the
58. Id. at 948 n.6 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
59. Perhaps Judge Roberts was doing what philosopher Daniel Dennett describes as confusing
determinism with fatalism. See Ronald Bailey, Pulling Our Own Strings, REASON 25, 27 (May
2003) (quoting Dennett as saying, “Fatalism is the idea that something’s going to happen no matter
what you do. Determinism is the idea that what you do depends. . . . still, what you do matters. . . .
Fatalism is determinism with you left out.”).
60. DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE LAW 27
(1999).
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purely legal viewpoint and assume free will, we will consider Jurek to be
an autonomous individual who may choose to be violent or not. Since it
is entirely possible that he will choose not to be violent, it would be
unjust to execute him. Besides, as Judge Roberts points out, there is the
empirical difficulty that we cannot see into the future in order to know
“beyond a reasonable doubt or to a moral certainty”61 what will happen.
Even if we take the purely “scientific” viewpoint, in Faigman’s terms,
and assume that Jurek’s future violence is predetermined based on his
nature and his nurture, it is still a policy decision whether we choose to
execute him based on our conclusions about his future behavior. It
would seem that we have a well-established, though flexibly defined,
policy known as “due process,” which, it could be argued, would
militate against using speculation about future behavior as justification
for an execution.
There is an additional problem with the Texas statute, which went
unaddressed by any of the Texas courts and even by the U.S. Supreme
Court when it eventually reviewed the case. The problem was perhaps
first pointed out by Professor Charles L. Black, Jr.62 Take another look at
article 37.071(b):
(b) On conclusion of the presentation of the evidence, the court shall
submit the following issues to the jury:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of
the deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable
expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat
to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant
in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the
provocation, if any, by the deceased.63

The jury has to answer “yes” to all three of the questions before a
defendant may receive the death penalty. The defendant may thus escape
execution by winning on any one of the three points. But this is less
consolation than one might think if one looks closely at the three
questions. Point (1) amounts to the question of whether the defendant
61. Jurek, 522 S.W.2d at 948 n.6 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
62. Charles L. Black, Jr., Due Process for Death: Jurek v. Texas and Companion Cases, 26
CATH. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1976).
63. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071(b) (Vernon 1973).
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killed deliberately. Remember that this is being asked as part of the
sentencing phase for first degree murder, where guilt has already been
determined. As noted earlier, Article 1257(b)(2), under which Jurek was
found guilty, provides:
(b) The punishment for murder with malice aforethought shall be death
or imprisonment for life if: . . .
(2) the person intentionally committed the murder in the course of
committing or attempting to commit kidnapping, burglary,
robbery, forcible rape, or arson . . . . 64

The phrases “malice aforethought” and “intentionally” already appear in
the definition of the crime.65 Since the jury will already have agreed that
these elements exist in finding the defendant guilty, it would be utterly
illogical for it now to find that the defendant didn’t do it “deliberately.”66
Likewise, point (3) raises the issue of whether the victim may have
provoked the murderer in some way. Surely, this issue would already
have been considered in the guilt phase, and if sufficient provocation had
been found the defendant would have been convicted of some lesser
charge, such as murder without malice or manslaughter.67 In short,
questions (1) and (3) involve issues that in most cases would have
already been answered affirmatively; the death sentence, then, would
depend entirely on the assessment of future dangerousness. But how can
there be “due process” when the outcome depends strictly on someone’s
surmises about the future, not on provable incidents from the past?
When Jurek’s case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice
Stevens, writing for a plurality, grappled with Jurek’s contention that it
was impossible to predict future behavior and that the question posed by
article 37.071(b)(2) was so vague as to be meaningless.68 Perhaps
“grappled” is the wrong word, considering what Justice Stevens and his
colleagues did with the question. Stevens wrote:
The fact that such a determination is difficult, however, does not mean
that it cannot be made. Indeed, prediction of future criminal conduct is
64. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1257(b)(2) (Vernon 1973) (emphasis added).
65. Note that the word “intentionally” does not appear in any of the other four categories of
first degree murder, though “malice aforethought” still applies to all of them. See TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 1257 (Vernon 1973). While § 1257 was the operating law at the time of Jurek’s crime, it had
already been superseded by TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03. (Vernon 1974) (effective January 1,
1974), which was substantially similar, by the time of the U.S. Supreme Court decision. See Jurek,
428 U.S. at 265 n.1.
66. Black, supra note 62, at 3-4.
67. Id.
68. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 274.
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an essential element in many of the decisions rendered throughout our
criminal justice system. The decision whether to admit a defendant to
bail, for instance, must often turn on a judge’s prediction of the
defendant’s future conduct. And any sentencing authority must predict
a convicted person’s probable future conduct when it engages in the
process of determining what punishment to impose. For those
sentenced to prison, these same predictions must be made by parole
authorities. The task that a Texas jury must perform in answering the
statutory question in issue is thus basically no different from the task
performed countless times each day throughout the American system
of criminal justice. What is essential is that the jury have before it all
possible relevant information about the individual defendant whose
fate it must determine.69

What the Court did here was not to grapple with, but to dodge the
issue. Yes, it is difficult to make predictions about the future, the Court
concedes; but we’ve been making predictions about the future for a long
time about many things, so why stop here? In other words, because the
criminal justice system makes predictions about the future in the
contexts of (a) setting bail, (b) sentencing in general, and (c) parole
decisions, why shouldn’t it make future predictions when it decides
whether or not to impose the death penalty? The Court could have
answered its own question with a phrase it coined in one of the
companion cases to Jurek, decided on the same day: “death is
different.”70 As the Court said in Gregg:
While Furman did not hold that the infliction of the death penalty per
se violates the Constitution’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments, it
did recognize that the penalty of death is different in kind from any
other punishment imposed under our system of criminal justice.
Because of the uniqueness of the death penalty, Furman held that it
could not be imposed under sentencing procedures that created a
substantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious
manner.71

But what could be more arbitrary and capricious than inflicting this
unique punishment based on someone’s guess about the future?
In fact, distinguishing common future dangerousness predictions (in
the settings of bail, general sentencing and parole) from future
dangerousness predictions in capital cases should have been child’s play
to jurists of Supreme Court caliber. As to bail, an overly cautious
69. Id. at 274-76 (citations omitted).
70. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188.
71. Id.
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prediction error in admitting a defendant to bail may involve a
temporary loss of the defendant’s liberty. And while questions of
punishment in noncapital cases may involve a consideration of future
dangerousness, they usually concentrate on the seriousness of the crime
or crimes the person has committed in the past. Finally, parole decisions
are actually decisions about whether to lessen a prisoner’s sentence, not
increase it. While there are potential hazards in all three situations, they
do not entail the irreversible extinguishing of the defendant’s life. In
addition, the Court entirely overlooked the fact that on that same day, it
had approved two death penalty schemes (Florida’s72 and Georgia’s73)
that did not use future dangerousness predictions.
But the Court, for whatever reason, chose to breeze over the fact,
and the accompanying legal principle, that death is different to uphold,
in theory, the use of future dangerousness predictions for determining
the death penalty. Other than the Court’s statement, “[w]hat is essential
is that the jury have before it all possible relevant information about the
individual defendant,”74 the Court’s opinion didn’t delve into the issue of
what kinds of information might be relevant in predicting future
dangerousness, and it didn’t touch the issue of how, or whether, expert
testimony might play a part in those predictions. Later, when Barefoot
came along, the Court was stuck by stare decisis, or at least it acted as if
it were. The Court’s decision in Barefoot was inevitable unless it forsook
the two points made in Jurek: (1) that the death penalty could turn on
future dangerousness predictions and (2) that the jury needed to have all
the relevant information about the defendant.
II. BAREFOOT BOY MEETS “DOCTOR DEATH” (BUT ONLY IN COURT)
While psychiatric testimony was not presented in Jurek,75 it
occupied center stage in the Barefoot case. On August 7, 1978, Thomas
Barefoot fatally shot a police officer in the head at point-blank range
after the officer had stopped him for questioning in an arson
investigation.76 A jury found him guilty of capital murder.77 At the
penalty phase of the trial, two psychiatrists, Drs. John Holbrook and
James Grigson, testified that Barefoot would probably commit future
72. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 242.
73. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153.
74. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276.
75. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 897 (“[T]here was only lay testimony with respect to dangerousness
in Jurek.”).
76. Barefoot v. Texas, 596 S.W.2d 875, 878-79 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
77. Id. at 878.
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acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.78
Neither psychiatrist had personally examined Barefoot; both based their
predictions on a set of hypothetical questions put to them by the
prosecution.79
Dr. Grigson, a Dallas forensic psychiatrist, nicknamed “Dr. Death”
for his testimony in death penalty cases, eventually testified for the state
of Texas in over 140 capital trials.80 Dr. Grigson’s testimony almost
never changed from case to case.81 He would testify “as a matter of
medical certainty” that the defendant was the most severe type of
“sociopath,” that is, a person who is not mentally ill, but is beyond the
range of psychiatric treatment.82 Dr. Grigson invariably stated that he
was 100% certain of his conclusions, that the defendant would only get
worse and would most certainly kill again if not executed.83 Over two
decades, Grigson testified in one-third of all Texas capital cases that
ended in the death penalty; in over 90% of the cases in which he
testified, the jury sentenced the defendant to death.84
A 1989 study of the post-commutation behavior of ninety-two
former Texas death row inmates whose death sentences were reversed
and commuted in the early 1980’s indicated that Dr. Grigson’s
predictions were extremely unreliable.85 In one case, Grigson continued
to maintain that his prediction at the trial—that the defendant was on the
“severe end of the scale” of sociopathy and would continue to be a threat
to society—had been correct, even after the prisoner was released from
death row because he was found to be innocent.86 In 1995, after repeated
reprimands, Grigson was expelled from the American Psychiatric
Association “for arriving at a psychiatric diagnosis without first having
examined the individuals in question, and for indicating, while testifying
in court as an expert witness, he could predict with 100% certainty that
78. Id. at 887.
79. Id.
80. Amnesty Int’l website, http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGAMR510282003 (20
February 2003). Dr. Grigson is profiled in Errol Morris’s documentary film, THE THIN BLUE LINE
(BFI/Third Floor/American Playhouse 1988).
81. Jonathan Sorensen & James Marquart, Prosecutorial and Jury Decision-Making in PostFurman Texas Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. SOC. CH. 743, 749 (1990-91).
82. James Marquart et al., Gazing Into the Crystal Ball: Can Jurors Accurately Predict
Dangerousness in Capital Cases?, 23 LAW & SOC. REV. 449, 458 (1989).
83. Brent E. Newton, A Case Study in Systemic Unfairness: The Texas Death Penalty, 19731994, 1 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 1, 23 (1994),
84. Id. at 22.
85. Marquart, supra note 82, at 461-62.
86. Amnesty Int’l website, http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGAMR510282003 (20
February 2003).
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the individuals would engage in future violent acts.”87 Nevertheless,
Thomas Barefoot was sentenced to death rather than life based on this
man’s testimony. Dr. Grigson still testifies for the state of Texas despite
his expulsion from the psychiatric ranks,88 but he has spawned a
“growing entourage of Grigson-like psychiatrists acting as hired guns for
the state.”89
As Jurek had already determined the admissibility of future
dangerousness predictions as a matter of constitutionality, it was left for
Barefoot to validate their admissibility as an evidentiary issue. Would
the Court use the Frye90 “general acceptance” test, a liberal
interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 702,91 or some other rule?
The American Psychiatric Association (APA) weighed in on the issue
with an amicus curiae brief which, somewhat surprisingly it may seem,
argued against admitting psychiatric testimony on future dangerousness.
The APA argued that psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness
were extremely unreliable:
Psychiatrists should not be permitted to offer a prediction concerning
the long-term future dangerousness of a defendant in a capital case, at
least in those circumstances where the psychiatrist purports to be
testifying as a medical expert possessing predictive expertise in this
area. Although psychiatric assessments may permit short-term
predictions of violent or assaultive behavior, medical knowledge has
simply not advanced to the point where long-term predictions—the
type of testimony at issue in this case—may be made with even
reasonable accuracy. The large body of research in this area indicates
that, even under the best of conditions, psychiatric predictions of longterm future dangerousness are wrong in at least two out of every three
cases.92

In addition, the APA argued that if such predictions did have to be
made, the psychiatrist ought at least to examine the defendant personally
87. Id.
88. TEXAS DEFENDER SERVICE, A STATE OF DENIAL: TEXAS JUSTICE AND THE DEATH
PENALTY 30 (as modified May 22, 2003), available at http://www.texasdefender.org/state%20of%
20denial/Chap3.pdf.
89. Sorensen & Marquart, supra note 81, at 749.
90. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding that expert testimony
based on a scientific principle is admissible only if the principle is “sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs”).
91. “If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.” FED. R. EVID. 702 (1975) (revised 2000).
92. APA Brief, supra note 4, at 8-9 (emphasis added).
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before making the prediction.93 Personal examination, however, would
not have made a difference in any of Dr. Grigson’s court appearances, it
seems, as he always predicted, whether he had examined a defendant or
not, that that person would be violent again.94 Perhaps the only
prediction that could be made with certainty was that Dr. Grigson, a
sociopath who showed no remorse, would kill again, using “junk
science”95 as his weapon.
As Professor John Monahan, one of the leading legal experts in the
field of future dangerousness jurisprudence, has noted, “[r]arely have
research data been as quickly or nearly universally accepted by the
academic and professional communities as those supporting the
proposition that mental health professionals are highly inaccurate at
predicting violent behavior.”96 Indeed, the statement has the ring of truth
because it is apparently a statement against interest. Psychiatrists as a
group were admitting their own shortcomings as predictors of future
violence and urging that members of their profession such as Dr.
Grigson forego the lucrative expert witness fees they could receive for
their services. Surely, one supposes, a group that is willing to diminish
its members’ incomes for the sake of truth must be operating in the
interests of justice.
While the APA is, in my opinion, correct that psychiatrists are not
very accurate in predicting future dangerousness,97 the APA Brief is not
quite the statement against interest that it seems to be. The APA Brief
emerged in the shadow of a 1976 California Supreme Court case,
Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California.98 That court held that a
psychotherapist has a duty of care to protect the intended victim of a
patient who presents a serious danger of violence.99 If psychiatrists were
to claim a high degree of accuracy in determining who presents a serious
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., George E. Dix, The Death Penalty, “Dangerousness,” Psychiatric Testimony,
and Professional Ethics, 5 AM. J. CRIM. L. 151, 155-61 (1977).
95. The phrase was coined by HUBER, supra note 1.
96. John Monahan, Predicting Violent Behavior: An Assessment of Clinical Techniques
(1981), quoted in Mark David Albertson, Can Violence Be Predicted? Future Dangerousness: The
Testimony of Experts in Capital Cases, 3 WTR CRIM. JUST. 18, 21 (1989).
97. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun states that the evidence establishing the
unreliability of psychiatric long-term predictions is “overwhelming.” Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 919
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). He cites over a dozen authorities for this proposition, see id. at 919, 919
n.2, and notes that neither the majority nor the state of Texas has cited a single reputable scientific
source refuting the conclusion that psychiatric predictions of future violence are wrong more often
than right. Id. at 919.
98. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
99. Id. at 340.
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danger of violence, their responsibility in such cases would be increased.
This would often leave them in the excruciating position of having to
choose between violating doctor-patient confidentiality and suffering
civil liability for their patients’ actions. If, on the other hand,
psychiatrists by their own admission are no better than anyone else at
predicting dangerousness, why should they be held to a higher duty of
care in protecting the intended victims of their patients? Liability in
negligence cases, after all, hinges on the defendant’s ability to foresee
possible harm to a plaintiff.100 If one can’t predict with any certainty,
how can one foresee; hence, how can one be liable? Thus, the APA’s
position on future dangerousness predictions acted as a self-protecting
disclaimer in the context of the Tarasoff duty to warn.
While there is ample underlying research to justify the APA’s
position, it may be a matter of policy as well as science. This may
explain why the APA still contends that “[p]sychiatrists have no special
knowledge or ability with which to predict dangerous behavior. Studies
have shown that even with patients in which there is a history of violent
acts, predictions of future violence will be wrong for two out of every
three patients.”101 This is despite the fact that it has been estimated that,
today, psychiatrists’ ability to predict dangerousness may have improved
to the point that “clinicians are able to distinguish violent from
nonviolent patients with a modest, better-than-chance level of
accuracy.”102 Still, this hardly brings clinical accuracy to the level of
reliability that one might wish when a human being’s life is in the
balance.
The Supreme Court in Barefoot could have taken any one of at least
three possible approaches to the admission of psychiatric testimony. It
could have chosen reliability as the keynote to admissibility, in which
case the psychiatric one-out-of-three average would not have made the
grade. It could have used the Frye general acceptance test,103 in which
case the APA Brief, representing as it did the general attitude among the
psychiatric profession, would also have kept Grigson’s testimony out.
The Court instead chose to follow a liberal interpretation of Federal Rule
of Evidence 702: as long as the testimony was relevant, and helpful to
the trier of fact, it was admissible.
100. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
101. APA Statement on Prediction of Dangerousness, quoted in APA FactSHEET on Violence
and Mental Illness, APA website, http://www.psych.org (2000).
102. Douglas Mossman, Assessing Predictions of Violence: Being Accurate About Accuracy,
62 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 783, 790 (1994).
103. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
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Barefoot made three arguments against the constitutionality of the
psychiatric testimony that had been entered against him: (1) that
psychiatrists in general are not competent to predict future
dangerousness with any reliability (a point that the APA Brief makes
difficult to contest), (2) that psychiatrists should not be allowed to make
future dangerousness predictions based on hypothetical questions
without having examined the defendant personally, and (3) that the
testimony of the two psychiatrists in this case was so unreliable that the
sentence should be set aside.104 The Supreme Court, with Justice White
writing for the majority, rejected all three arguments.105
The Court rejected the first argument—that psychiatrists in general
are not competent to predict future dangerousness with any reliability—
because it had already, by implication, rejected it in Jurek.106 Never
mind that psychiatric testimony was not offered in that case.107 Never
mind that the issue of the reliability of psychiatric testimony had not
been briefed or argued. The Court had said that all relevant information
should be admissible108 and that was that. When the Court said “relevant
information,” that must have included psychiatric evidence, no matter
how unreliable—not that they’d really thought about it at the time. In
other words, the Barefoot Court unblinkingly considered the question of
admissibility of psychiatric testimony to have been decided in Jurek,
though the specific issue had not been before the Court in that case.
The Court fell back on its hypothesis (I hesitate to use the word
“reasoning”) in Jurek that if it eliminated future dangerousness
prediction in death sentencing, it might have to get rid of it in other areas
of the law.109 Again, no attempt was made to distinguish between capital
sentencing and other kinds of legal judgment. The Court cites a
statement by Professor Monahan that “there may be circumstances in
which prediction is both empirically possible and ethically
appropriate,”110 without catching on to the very narrow and tentative
nature of the statement. Yes, there may be some situations in which
prediction is ethical and appropriate, but that does not mean it is
therefore ethical and appropriate in all situations. The Court fails to pick
up the hint from Monahan that prediction could be held to be appropriate
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 896.
Id.
Id. at 896-97.
Id. at 897.
Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276.
Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 897.
Id. at 899 n.7, quoting JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT
BEHAVIOR, at v (1981).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2004

17

Akron Law Review, Vol. 37 [2004], Iss. 3, Art. 2
REGNIER1.DOC

486

4/26/2004 11:04 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[37:469

in some contexts but not others.
This hint would have been most useful to the Court if it wanted to
reconsider one of its main premises, namely, that if lay people are
allowed to make predictions of future dangerousness, then why
shouldn’t psychiatrists—people who are trained in the study of human
behavior—be able to make such predictions.111 The Court might have
said that when it comes to the death penalty, no one, layman or
psychiatrist, should be able to make predictions about future
dangerousness. But the Court had already decided in Jurek that they
could.112
The majority answered the problem of the unreliability of
psychiatric testimony with a determined faith that the adversarial system
would sort it all out:
Psychiatric testimony predicting dangerousness may be countered not
only as erroneous in a particular case but also as generally so
unreliable that it should be ignored. If the jury may make up its mind
about future dangerousness unaided by psychiatric testimony, jurors
should not be barred from hearing the views of the State’s psychiatrists
along with opposing views of the defendant’s doctors.113

In other words, if the state presents an expert witness saying the
defendant will commit future acts of violence, the defense can simply
present expert witnesses who say that the state’s witnesses are mistaken,
or that they are quacks. Then the jury can try to make sense of it all. The
Court quotes with approval the district court’s114 analysis of the role of
the jury vis-à-vis expert witnesses:
[T]he differences among the experts were quantitative, not qualitative.
The differences in opinion go to the weight [of the evidence] and not
the admissibility of such testimony . . . . Such disputes are within the
province of the jury to resolve. Indeed, it is a fundamental premise of
our entire system of criminal jurisprudence that the purpose of the jury
is to sort out the true testimony from the false, the important matters
from the unimportant matters, and, when called upon to do so, to give
greater credence to one party’s expert witnesses than another’s. Such
matters occur routinely in the American judicial system, both civil and
111. Id. at 896-97.
112. Id. at 896.
113. Id. at 898-99.
114. Barefoot’s case reached the Supreme Court through the habeas corpus route, as an
application for stay of execution, which was treated (and granted) as a petition for writ of certiorari,
rather than through the ordinary certiorari route. Barefoot v. Estelle, 459 U.S. 1169 (1983); Id. at
885-87.
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criminal.115

A jury’s job is to decide matters of fact. Admittedly, this sometimes
involves speculation about the future. For example, in the damages
phase of a wrongful death suit, a jury might decide how much money the
decedent would have earned in his life if he had not been killed at, say,
age thirty-four. In such a case, a jury can extrapolate a reasonable figure
based on the decedent’s skill, training, and past earnings. The result will
always be, at best, an educated guess, but some kind of estimate is
necessary in order to compensate the victim’s family. But prediction of a
murderer’s future dangerousness is a much more uncertain proposition
because the vast majority of murderers do not kill again and, in fact,
have a tendency not to commit further violent crimes.116 Besides, being
able to permit a certain amount of speculation in matters involving
money damages does not mean we can allow the same degree of
uncertainty in matters involving a person’s liberty. Even less should we
tolerate such uncertainty when a person’s life is at stake.
The majority notes, however, that Barefoot offered no evidence at
trial to rebut Drs. Holbrook and Grigson.117 The Court implies that this
must have been the defense’s fault because Texas law provided a $500
budget for indigent defendants such as Barefoot to use for purposes of
investigation and expert testimony.118 The Court does not consider
whether this might be enough to pay for the services of an expert witness
to rebut the two psychiatrists, especially when it is supposed to cover
costs of investigation as well. Here again, the Court does not even
address the possible due process violation. But how fair can the
“adversarial” process be when one side (the state) has nearly unlimited
resources with which to retain expert witnesses, while the defense has
only $500?
In addition, the district court had said, “[t]he majority of psychiatric
experts agree that where there is a pattern of repetitive assaultive and
violent conduct, the accuracy of psychiatric predictions of future
dangerousness dramatically rises,”119 but that court did not make it clear
that the improved accuracy did not apply to clinical predictions, but to
predictions based on statistical analysis. As the APA stated: “To the
extent such predictions have any validity, they can only be made on the
115. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 902.
116. See Michael L. Radelet & James W. Marquart, Assessing Nondangerousness During
Penalty Phases of Capital Trials, 54 ALB. L. REV. 845, 854-55 (1990).
117. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 899 n.5.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 902.
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basis of essentially actuarial data to which psychiatrists, qua
psychiatrists, can bring no special interpretative skills.”120
The Supreme Court opinion admits that neither Barefoot nor the
APA “suggests that psychiatrists are always wrong with respect to future
dangerousness, only most of the time.”121 Well, that’s a relief.
Apparently, the Court has some standards. If one is sometimes right, his
testimony is admissible. Is this a hint that the Court might be so rigorous
as to exclude testimony that is always wrong?
But while the Court seems to be basing much of its decision on
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, it misses the opportunity to apply Federal
Rule of Evidence 403, which states that relevant evidence “may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.”122
All this time that the Court has been looking at relevance, it has ignored
the question of the evidence’s probative value. How probative is expert
testimony that is wrong two-thirds of the time? More specifically, in the
context of the Texas death penalty statute, how probative is expert
testimony that is wrong two-thirds of the time when it is being offered to
establish a matter that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt? In
other words, when the standard of proof is that high, how can evidence
so unreliable even be considered to make a meaningful contribution
towards a resolution? In the context of capital sentencing, courts should
be especially wary of the dangers of unfair prejudice. And when the
evidence presented has such a high probability of being wrong, its
probative value would seem to be not just outweighed by the chance of
unfair prejudice, but substantially outweighed, as FRE 403 requires. As
the APA said:
[T]he use of psychiatric testimony on this issue causes serious
prejudice to the defendant. By dressing up the actuarial data with an
“expert” opinion, the psychiatrist’s testimony is likely to receive undue
weight. In addition, it permits the jury to avoid the difficult actuarial
questions by seeking refuge in a medical diagnosis that provides a false
aura of certainty. For these reasons, psychiatric testimony on future
dangerousness impermissibly distorts the fact-finding process in
capital cases.123

The Court rejected Barefoot’s second argument—that psychiatrists

120.
121.
122.
123.

APA Brief, supra note 4, at 9.
Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 900.
FED. R. EVID. 403.
APA Brief, supra note 4, at 9.
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should not be allowed to make future dangerousness predictions based
on hypothetical questions, without having examined the defendant
personally124—on similar grounds to those on which it rejected
Barefoot’s first argument. The use of hypotheticals rather than a clinical
examination went to the weight of the evidence rather than its
admissibility.125 Hypotheticals are standard evidentiary procedure, and
the Court saw no reason why this should change just because the death
penalty was involved.126 Let the jury sort it out.
Finally, the Court dismissed Barefoot’s third argument, that the
testimony of the two psychiatrists in this case was so unreliable that the
sentence should be set aside.127 Barefoot argued that the hypothetical
questions given to the two psychiatrists used controverted facts.128 The
Court responded that Barefoot’s attorney, on cross-examination, could
have propounded a set of hypothetical facts in conformity with
Barefoot’s theory of the case.129
In its conclusion the majority said that to agree with Barefoot’s
position would seriously undermine and, in effect, overrule Jurek,130
which appears by this time to have achieved the status of sacred cow.
This hardly seems an accurate rendition of that case, however. Jurek
established that, as a constitutional matter, future dangerousness
predictions could be used in death penalty sentencing. It said that all
“relevant information” could be adduced but didn’t delve into what was
relevant or how other rules of evidence, such as FRE 403, might apply.
It did not address the issue of admissibility of psychiatric testimony
because that issue wasn’t raised. Barefoot went beyond Jurek by holding
that psychiatric testimony was admissible as long as it was relevant—
even if it was inaccurate, even if it was based on hypotheticals rather
than examination, even if those hypotheticals were based on disputed
facts—and by rejecting consideration of the reliability of the testimony
or general acceptance of the principles underlying it.

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
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III. MINORITY REPORT:131 BLACKMUN’S PIQUE
In a positively livid dissent to the Barefoot decision, Justice
Blackmun,132 joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, fumes: “In the
present state of psychiatric knowledge, this is too much for me.”133 To
Blackmun, the fact that it is a capital case clearly does make a
difference: “One may accept this in a routine lawsuit for money
damages, but when a person’s life is at stake—no matter how heinous
his offense–a requirement of greater reliability should prevail.”134
After a quick survey of the “overwhelming” scientific evidence
(unrebutted by the majority or the state of Texas) on the unreliability of
psychiatric predictions,135 Blackmun hones in on the difference, noted by
the APA, between clinical predictions and statistical predictions.136 The
statistical predictions are usable by laymen and are possibly more
accurate than the psychiatrists’ clinical predictions.137 While psychiatric
predictions may be more reliable where there is a pattern of repetitive
assault and violent conduct, says Blackmun, “psychiatrists have no
special insights to add to this actuarial fact, and a single violent crime
cannot provide a basis for a reliable prediction of future violence.”138
Psychiatrists may be less accurate predictors than laymen because they
would prefer to have someone wrongly incarcerated or executed than be
held liable for later violence committed by that individual.139 Blackmun
argues that there was no reliable trial testimony that Barefoot had
committed acts of violence other than the crime for which he was being
tried, only testimony that he had a bad reputation for peaceable and law
abiding conduct.140 “A death sentence cannot rest on highly dubious
predictions secretly based on a factual foundation of hearsay and pure

131. The recent film MINORITY REPORT (DreamWorks LLC/Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp. 2002) is relevant to the subject of future dangerousness. There, in a futuristic society, law
enforcement officials are able to predict murders reliably and thereby prevent them from happening.
The police then arrest the would-be murderers as if they had actually succeeded in their intended
crimes. In an early scene in the film, a law enforcement officer arrests a man for the “future murder”
of his wife. The arrestee protests, “I didn’t do anything,” to no avail, as he is led away in shackles.
132. Note that Justice Blackmun concurred with the majority in Jurek, 428 U.S. at 279
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
133. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 916 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 920-21 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 921-22 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 922 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 922 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 922 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 922 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol37/iss3/2

22

Regnier: Barefoot in Quicksand
REGNIER1.DOC

2004]

4/26/2004 11:04 AM

BAREFOOT IN QUICKSAND

491

conjecture.”141
Blackmun demonstrates that Jurek is not the only case that can be
used as precedent. He cites Jurek’s companion case, Gregg, for the
proposition that “accurate sentencing information is an indispensable
prerequisite to a reasoned determination of whether a defendant shall
live or die by a jury of people who may never before have made a
sentencing decision.”142 He cites Woodson, another companion case to
Jurek, on the qualitative difference between the death penalty and any
other punishment. “Because of that qualitative difference, there is a
corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination
that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.”143 Blackmun
echoes the APA’s point that jurors are likely to invest psychiatrists with
greater infallibility on the subject of future violence than they actually
have.144 He quotes Imwinkelried on the “aura” surrounding scientific
experts in jurors’ minds:
Scientific evidence impresses lay jurors. They tend to assume it is
more accurate and objective than lay testimony. A juror who thinks of
scientific evidence visualizes instruments capable of amazingly precise
measurement, of findings arrived at by dispassionate scientific tests. In
short, in the mind of the typical lay juror, a scientific witness has a
special aura of credibility.145

Blackmun points out that because juries may overestimate the probative
value of polygraph evidence, it is usually excluded from trials despite
what he calls conservative estimates that it is accurate 80 to 90 percent
of the time when administered by experienced examiners.146
Next, Blackmun argues against the majority’s undue faith that the
adversarial process will do justice in such circumstances.147 Crossexamination may not reveal the flaws in psychiatric testimony, says
Blackmun, because such predictions are often based on subjective
factors.148 Suppose, for example, that a psychiatrist claims an ability to
141. Id.
142. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 190, cited in Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 928 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
143. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305, cited in Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 924 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
144. APA Brief, supra note 4, at 9.
145. Edward Imwinkelried, Evidence Law and Tactics for the Proponents of Scientific
Evidence, in SCIENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE 33, 37 (E. Imwinkelried ed. 1981), cited in
Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 928 n.8 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
146. Bruce J. Ennis & Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise:
Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 736 (1974), cited in Barefoot, 463 U.S. at
930 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
147. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 929-30 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 931-32 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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make predictions based on his many years of clinical experience. If the
psychiatrist says that a defendant shows many of the same symptoms as
patients who later became violent and that, in his opinion, the defendant
will likely be violent, what is a defense attorney to do? Grill the
psychiatrist on all his past patients who had similar symptoms?
Challenge the psychiatrist’s sincerity in stating his clinical opinion? The
following exchange shows what a slippery customer a clever psychiatrist
like Dr. Grigson could be on cross examination. In the Ernest Smith, Jr.
trial, Dr. Grigson testified on direct examination that the defendant was a
“severe sociopath” with no conscience and no regard for other people’s
lives or property, and was likely to commit future acts of violence.149 On
cross, the defense counsel tried to establish that Grigson was
prosecution-oriented:
Q. On how many occasions do you think that you have ever testified
for anybody other than the District Attorney’s Office?
A. Well, I never testify for anybody. I only testify as to what my
findings are. Usually, if the Defense Attorney likes what I have
found, they [sic] call me. If the District Attorney’s Office—well,
usually they call me whether they like it or dislike it. I never testify
for anybody.150

Note here how this thoroughly pro-prosecution witness manages to pass
himself off as neutral and to imply that prosecutors are more likely than
defense lawyers to be interested in his testimony whether it goes for their
case or against it. When defense lawyers have tried to impeach Dr.
Grigson with the APA’s condemnation of his testimony, Dr. Grigson has
deflected such attacks by saying that he is the preeminent mental health
expert on the criminal mind and that the APA is just a group of East
Coast liberals who oppose the death penalty and think “queers are
normal.”151
Finally, Blackmun attacks the adequacy of the adversarial system to
get to the truth in matters related to a person’s mental state.152 He quotes
then-Chief Justice Burger, in a statement Burger wrote before he was on
the Court:
The very nature of the adversary system . . . complicates the use of
scientific opinion evidence, particularly in the field of psychiatry. This
system of partisan contention, of attack and counterattack, at its best is
149.
150.
151.
152.

Dix, supra note 94, at 157-58.
Id. at 159 (quoting Smith Transcript at 2948-49).
Ron Rosenbaum, Travels with Dr. Death, VANITY FAIR 141, 168, 147 (May 1990).
Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 931-32 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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not ideally suited to developing an accurate portrait or profile of the
human personality, especially in the area of abnormal behavior.153

Blackmun expands on this point to observe that where one expert tells
jurors that he knows a defendant will commit violent acts, while an
opposing expert tells them that no one can predict who will be violent,
the jurors are more likely to believe the expert who speaks with
certainty, as this will be more helpful to them in performing their
duty.154 He expresses concern that jurors’ attention will be drawn to the
sideshow of experts and away from the individualized sentencing that
the Eighth Amendment requires.155
IV. BLACKMUN’S REVENGE: DAUBERT CHANGES EVERYTHING
– OR DOES IT?
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as interpreted in Barefoot, was the
laissez faire rule on admissibility of expert testimony. Federal judges
didn’t have to worry much about screening expert testimony. Usually, as
long as it was relevant, they could let it in and the jury would decide
what to do with it. Some Circuits, such as the Ninth, however, still used
the Frye general acceptance test for screening scientific testimony. But
in 1993, the Daubert case156 seemed to change everything. Unlike Jurek
and Barefoot, Daubert was not a criminal case, and it had nothing to do
with psychiatric testimony. It was a civil case in which children born
with birth defects sued the manufacturer of Bendectin, an anti-morning
sickness drug, claiming that Bendectin was the cause of their
deformities.157 More than thirty published studies on Bendectin
involving 130,000 patients had failed to find that the drug caused birth
defects.158 The children produced heavily credentialed experts of their
own, though the experts’ findings had not been published and peer
reviewed.159 The district court, applying the general acceptance test,
refused to admit the children’s experts and granted summary judgment
to the drug manufacturer. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, citing Frye.160 The

153. Warren Burger, Psychiatrists, Lawyers, and the Court, 28 FED. PROB. 3, 6 (1964), cited in
Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 932-33.
154. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 934 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 934-35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
156. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
157. Id. at 582.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 583.
160. Id. at 584.
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U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.161
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, clarified a question that
scholars had puzzled over since 1975, namely, did the Federal Rules of
Evidence on expert testimony supersede the Frye test, or were they
meant to co-exist with it?162 The Court said (unanimously on at least this
particular point) that the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded Frye.163
It interpreted Federal Rule of Evidence 401 to mandate a liberal standard
of relevance.164 Up to this point, it sounds as if nothing has changed
since Barefoot.
But, wait! This is Blackmun writing, remember? Suddenly, in a part
of the opinion that gets only a 7-to-2 majority, he writes, “under the
Rules the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or
evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”165 Reliable! Shades
of the Barefoot dissent! Psychiatric predictions of dangerousness would
never have been admitted if they had to be reliable. This could change
everything. The Court goes on to hold that the mention of “scientific . . .
knowledge” in Federal Rule of Evidence 702 implies knowledge that is
reliable and sets up federal judges as gatekeepers with the assigned task
of keeping out evidence that is unreliable.166 One can almost picture
Justice Blackmun getting ready to give Dr. Death the boot when he
appears at the gate seeking admission.
Daubert goes on to list a set of factors (illustrative, not definitive)
that can be used to determine whether proposed scientific testimony is
indeed scientific (i.e., reliable) knowledge that will be helpful (i.e.,
relevant) to the trier of fact in understanding or determining a fact in
issue.167 The Court suggests these factors: (1) Has the theory or
technique been (or can it be) tested?168 (2) Has the theory or technique
been subjected to peer review and publication?169 (3) What is the
technique’s known or potential rate of error?170 (4) Has it been generally
accepted in the relevant scientific community?171
While the list of factors does not purport to be exhaustive, it is

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585.
Id. at 586 n.4.
Id. at 587.
Id.
Id. at 589.
Id. at 589-90.
Id. at 592.
Id. at 593.
Id.
Id. at 594.
Id.
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instructive to apply it to psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness:
(1) Have such predictions been tested? Yes, they have, and they have
been found to be wrong two-thirds of the time.172 (2) Has the theory or
technique been subject to peer review and publication? Yes, and
numerous studies have found it to be unreliable.173 (3) What is the
technique’s known or potential rate of error? See answer to (1) above.
(4) Has it been generally accepted in the relevant scientific community?
No, the relevant scientific community has officially rejected it.174 A
judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has said that
psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness appear to fail all the
Daubert factors.175 All this means that psychiatric predictions of future
dangerousness are on their way out, right? Well, not so fast.
Of course, the state of Texas was not obliged to adopt the Daubert
rules for admitting scientific testimony just because the federal courts
had done so. The Supreme Court had propounded an evidentiary
principle, not a constitutional one; states could still have their own rules
of evidence. But the Texas evidence rules are patterned after the Federal
Rules.176 In 1995, in DuPont v. Robinson,177 the Texas Supreme Court in
essence adopted Daubert, though it added a few wrinkles of its own. In
addition to the four Daubert factors for determining reliability and
relevance, the Texas court added: (1) the extent to which the technique
relies on the subjective interpretation of the expert, and (2) the nonjudicial uses of the theory or technique.178 The first of these new factors
does not seem to favor psychiatric clinical predictions of future
dangerousness, which rely a great deal on the doctor’s impressions.
Predictions based on statistics would be less subjective, except that there
is always some degree of subjectivity involved in determining the
characteristics that go into analyzing the statistics (e.g., if asked whether
a patient has been “violent” in the past, would one count his smashing a
coffee mug as violence, or would he have had to strike a person to be
considered violent?). As for the second new factor, there are nonjudicial uses for clinical predictions of future dangerousness. People in
mental institutions have to make them all the time, though they are
aware that much of what they are doing is a guess. Still, these new

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
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Id.
Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 464-65 (5th Cir. 2000) (Garza, J., specially concurring).
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factors, added to the old ones, do not move one very far in the direction
of wanting to call future dangerousness predictions reliable. Any way
one slices it, such predictions are still wrong much more often than they
are right. Under Daubert/Robinson, clinical predictions of future
dangerousness, would no longer be admissible, one might assume, even
in Texas. One would be wrong.179
V. WAITING FOR KUMHO, FINDING NENNO
While Federal Rule of Evidence702 applies to “scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge,” Daubert limited its holding to scientific
knowledge.180 This left open questions about whether Daubert’s
gatekeeping function and reliability/relevance factors applied to such
expert witnesses as airplane pilots, beekeepers, real estate appraisers,
accountants, auto mechanics—all of whom have particular expertise and
experience that might help a trier of fact, but who are clearly not
scientists. In 1999, in Kumho,181 the Supreme Court addressed this issue;
but up until that time, other courts had to confront the question on their
own.
In 1998, in Nenno v. State,182 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
again dealt with the question of expert testimony regarding future
dangerousness in the penalty phase of a capital murder case, this time in
the light of the Daubert/Robinson test. By this time, article 37.071 of the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which laid out the sentencing
procedure for capital murder, had been amended (as of 1991) so that the
moot-for-all-practical-purposes
questions
about
deliberateness
(subsection (b)(1)) and provocation (subsection (b)(3)) were
eliminated.183 Though there were other changes (e.g., mitigating
179. See John Monahan, Violence Risk Assessment: Scientific Validity and Evidentiary
Admissibility, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 901, 910-15 (2000).
180. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.8.
181. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
182. Nenno, 970 S.W.2d at 549.
183. The article provides, in pertinent part:
Sec. 2. . . .
(b) On conclusion of the presentation of the evidence, the court shall submit the
following issues to the jury:
(1) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
(2) in cases in which the jury charge at the guilt or innocence stage permitted the
jury to find the defendant guilty as a party under Sections 7.01 and 7.02, Penal
Code, whether the defendant actually caused the death of the deceased or did not
actually cause the death of the deceased but intended to kill the deceased or another
or anticipated that a human life would be taken.
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evidence could be presented on behalf of the defendant184), future
dangerousness was still a required question at sentencing in capital
murder cases.185
Eric Charles Nenno had been found guilty of raping and choking to
death a seven-year-old girl.186 The state of Texas presented “expert”
testimony on future dangerousness from Kenneth Lanning, a
Supervisory Special Agent in the Behavioral Science unit of the FBI,
who specialized in studying the sexual victimization of children.187
Based on information given about Nenno, Lanning concluded that he
was a pedophile and that such a person was difficult to rehabilitate.188
After being given a lengthy hypothetical matching the facts shown by
the evidence, Lanning testified that an individual matching the
hypothetical “would be an extreme threat to society and especially
children within his age preference.”189
Citing Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 702 (identical at the time
to Federal Rule of Evidence 702190), as interpreted in Kelly v. State,191
Nenno challenged the admissibility of Lanning’s testimony.192 In Kelly,
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that Rule 702 required the
satisfaction of a three-part reliability test before novel scientific evidence
would be admissible: (1) the underlying scientific theory must be valid;
(2) the technique applying the theory must be valid; and (3) the
technique must have been properly applied on the occasion in
question.193 The court further held that factors relating to this
determination of reliability include, but are not limited to: (a) acceptance
by the relevant scientific community, (b) qualifications of the expert, (c)
literature concerning the technique, (d) the potential rate of error of the
technique, (e) the availability of other experts to test and evaluate the
technique, (f) the clarity with which the underlying theory or technique
can be explained to the court, and (g) the experience and skill of the
(c) The state must prove each issue submitted under Subsection (b) of this article beyond
a reasonable doubt, and the jury shall return a special verdict of “yes” or “no” on each
issue submitted under Subsection (b) of this Article.
TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon 1991) (effective September 1, 1991).
184. See TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 § 2(a)(1) (Vernon 1991).
185. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 § 2(b)(1) (Vernon 1991).
186. Nenno, 970 S.W.2d at 552.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See id. at 560 n.7; FED. R. EVID. 702 (1975) (revised 2000).
191. Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
192. Nenno, 970 S.W.2d at 560.
193. Kelly, 824 S.W.2d at 573.
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person applying the technique.194 The court later held that this inquiry is
substantively identical to the inquiry mandated by the Supreme Court in
the federal system in Daubert.195
But Lanning was not a doctor,196 and the evidence he gave did not
purport to be scientific evidence.197 So how should Kelly be applied to
this type of nonscientific (i.e., involving technical or other specialized
knowledge) testimony?198 The court, in an opinion written by Judge
Keller,199 presciently anticipated Kumho by saying that Daubert’s
gatekeeping function applied to all forms of expert testimony.200 It added
that the four factors in Daubert do not necessarily apply outside the
“hard science” context, but could vary depending on the field of
expertise.201 The court did not attempt to draw a bright line between
“hard” and “soft” sciences, or nonscientific testimony, and admitted that
the distinction might often be blurred.202 It did, however, speak of fields
apart from the hard sciences, “such as the social sciences or fields that
are based primarily upon experience and training as opposed to the
scientific method.”203 By now, one can see the end-run around the
gatekeeper coming. Partly, it is accomplished by the fact that the expert
witness is not a doctor. This may seem to satisfy Blackmun’s and the
APA’s complaint that having a doctor testify on future dangerousness
gives the testimony an unwarranted aura of credibility. Conceding that
prediction of future dangerousness is not a “science” lessens the
standard under which it is admitted.
Thus, in Nenno, the court held that Kelly’s reliability requirement
applied, but with less rigor, to soft science and nonscientific fields.204
The court formulated a new set of criteria for such fields:
(1) whether the field of expertise is a legitimate one, (2) whether the
subject matter of the expert’s testimony is within the scope of that
field, and (3) whether the expert’s testimony properly relies upon
and/or utilizes the principles involved in the field. These questions are
merely an appropriately tailored translation of the Kelly test to areas

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id.
Jordan v. State, 928 S.W.2d 550, 554 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
Nenno, 970 S.W.2d at 552, 562.
Id. at 560.
Id.
Id. at 551.
Id. at 561.
Id.
Id. at 560-61.
Id. at 561.
Id.
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outside of hard science. And, hard science methods of validation, such
as assessing the potential rate of error or subjecting a theory to peer
review, may often be inappropriate for testing the reliability of fields
of expertise outside the hard sciences.205

The court next applied this test to expert-witness Lanning’s
testimony. Lanning stated that his analysis was based on his experience
studying the sexual victimization of children for fifteen years full-time
and eight years part-time prior to that.206 He had been with the FBI for
over twenty-five years, and had been with a Behavioral Science Unit of
the FBI Academy for fifteen years.207 He did not claim that he had a
particular methodology for assessing future dangerousness.208 The court
stated that research concerning the behavior of offenders who sexually
victimize children appeared to be a legitimate field of expertise:
“Through interviews, case studies, and statistical research, a person may
acquire, as a result of such experience, superior knowledge concerning
the behavior of such offenders.”209 The court found that Lanning’s
testimony showed that future dangerousness was a subject that often
surfaced during the course of research in the field of child
victimization.210 Lanning testified that he had studied more than a
thousand cases that concerned future dangerousness in some way.211 His
research included personally interviewing inmates convicted of child sex
offenses, examining the inmates’ psychological records, and examining
the facts of the offenses involved.212
Nenno complained about the lack of peer review of Lanning’s
technique.213 “But the absence of peer review,” the court responded,
“does not necessarily undercut the reliability of the testimony presented
here. To the extent that a factfinder could decide that the absence of peer
review cast doubt on the credibility of the testimony, such affects the
weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility.”214 The court found
Lanning’s testimony to be sufficiently reliable under Rule 702.215 How is
this any different from Barefoot? What makes Lanning’s testimony any
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
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more reliable than Dr. Death’s? Application of Daubert makes no
difference, it would seem, where future dangerousness is concerned.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ superficial analysis shows
just how weak its new reliability test is. The first question is the vague
one of whether the field is “legitimate.” So, what do we mean by
“legitimate,” and what is the difference between that and “reliable”?
Presumably, rocket science is legitimate and tarot cards are not, but how
do we judge all the soft and semi-soft sciences in the middle? The court
concludes that the study of child victimization is a legitimate field
because it utilizes such techniques as interviews, case studies, and
statistical research.216 These are certainly valid research methods, and
Lanning would appear to be eminently qualified to talk about the subject
of child victimization ad nauseam. But does one’s knowledge about
child victimization cases qualify one to make predictions about a
person’s future behavior? Before we listen to such predictions, shouldn’t
we be told what bases (I’m not even going so far as to ask for
“principles”) the expert uses to make his predictions? Wouldn’t it be
helpful to know how accurate the expert’s predictions have been in the
past? This is something that can be tested: How many times in the past
did Lanning make a prediction about someone’s future dangerousness,
and how often was he right? Is that too rigorous a test to require, even
for a soft science? The court says that potential rate of error may not be
appropriate for assessing the reliability of fields outside the hard
sciences,217 but it gives no reason why such information would be
inappropriate here. Indeed, it seems it would be highly relevant. Why not
a general acceptance test: What does the APA, for example think about
Lanning’s future dangerousness predictions? What about the
Daubert/Robinson factor of the expert’s subjectivity?218 Isn’t Lanning
ultimately just giving us his “gut feeling?” While I agree that not all
Daubert factors must necessarily be applied to so-called soft sciences,
there is no need to jettison them all when several of them might
reasonably be asked and would be most useful in gauging reliability.
In short, the court does an ipse dixit on the first question of its
three-part test (whether the field of expertise is a legitimate one), in
effect saying, “Is it legitimate? Yes.” It skimps on the second and third
parts. Regarding the second prong (whether the subject matter of the
expert’s testimony is within the scope of the field), the court never

216. Nenno, 970 S.W.2d at 562.
217. Id. at 561.
218. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 557.
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explains how Lanning’s expertise in child victimization puts his
testimony on future dangerousness within the scope of that field. The
court does not say whether Lanning has had to make predictions on
future dangerousness as part of his job or if he has merely studied other
people’s predictions. As for the third prong of the test (whether the
expert’s testimony properly relies on or utilizes the principles involved
in the field), the court never addresses this because it never establishes
that there are any principles on which Lanning is basing his testimony.
For all one can glean from the opinion, Lanning’s testimony amounts to
saying, in effect, “I’ve studied thousands of child victimizers who
committed similar crimes later on, and Mr. Nenno certainly reminds me
of them.” The court never even says what Lanning considers the telling
characteristics of a repeat child victimizer to be.
Future dangerousness predictions in death penalty cases are alive
and well in Texas.219 When the Kumho decision came down from the
U.S. Supreme Court a year after Nenno, it left the Daubert reliability test
so flexible that it did nothing to upset the test established in Nenno.220
The Kumho Court, in an opinion by Justice Breyer, clarified that
Daubert’s gatekeeping obligation applies to all expert testimony, not just
scientific testimony.221 The Court reiterated that the purpose of the
gatekeeping role was to ensure the reliability and relevance of expert
testimony while still giving trial courts considerable leeway in deciding
how to assess reliability; courts were not bound to use the Daubert
factors but could improvise their own sets of tests to determine
reliability.222 As the Court had already held in Joiner that a trial court’s
219. See, e.g., Murphy v. State, 112 S.W.3d 592, 596-97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (finding
harmless error where state dismissed juror for cause because she would require proof of another
murder or attempted murder before finding appellant would commit criminal acts of violence that
would pose a continuing threat to society); Guevara v. State, 97 S.W.3d 579, 581 (Tex. Crim. App.
2003) (reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence at punishment to determine whether any rational
trier of fact could have believed beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant would probably commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society); Reyes v. State, 84
S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (affirming exclusion of pro-defendant psychologist’s
testimony on mitigating factors regarding future dangerousness); Ripkowski v. State, 61 S.W.3d
378, 385 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (affirming admission of psychiatric testimony on defendant’s
future dangerousness despite lack of Miranda warnings before psychiatrists interviewed defendant).
220. Nenno was cited as precedent in Hernandez v. State, 53 S.W.3d 742, 748-50 (Tex. App.
2001) (admitting testimony on Child Abuse Accommodation Syndrome where expert had not
conducted any studies or published any articles, did not know the potential error rate of her opinion,
but testified that her opinions were based on experience, observation, and training, and was
unimpeached in her assertion that her data and opinions were recognized by the general community
of psychology and psychiatry).
221. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 141.
222. Id. at 152-53.
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decision whether to exclude expert testimony would be reviewed on an
“abuse of discretion” standard rather than a de novo standard,223 this left
a great deal of freedom (or, to view it from a different angle, an utter
lack of guidance) to federal district court judges in exercising their
gatekeeping function. Kumho proved so congenial to already-existing
Texas law that it was cited approvingly in Texas evidentiary case law the
month after it was decided.224 Thus, there is nothing standing in the way
of Texas judges who wish to admit psychiatric, or other, testimony on
future dangerousness in the sentencing phase of death penalty cases.
VI. KANGAROO COURT
In my opinion, future dangerousness predictions should not be
admitted in the penalty phases of capital cases, no matter how reliable
they might eventually become. If “due process” means anything, it
should mean that one may not be put to death based on speculation about
his future conduct, no matter how reasonable the speculation. As a
person has a right not to be deprived of life without due process of
law,225 the presumption is in favor of life, and the state should have to
surmount a very high hurdle to overcome that presumption. Where, on
the other hand, future predictions are used to spare a life, the state’s
burden is lower, since the state is acting in favor of the presumption of
life. Declining, for example, to execute a prisoner based on doctors’
diagnoses that he has a short time to live would not be an abuse of future
prediction because the benefit of the doubt goes toward preserving life.
Even if future dangerousness predictions do not fail the
constitutional due process test, they still fail on evidentiary principles
because they violate Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which provides that
relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury.”226 When one profession, the psychiatric
community, maintains that there is overwhelming evidence that clinical
predictions of future dangerousness are unreliable, and where a
particular clinician, such as Dr. Grigson, has been found in empirical
studies to be highly inaccurate, it is a sad miscarriage of justice for a
judge to allow Grigson or a Grigson-like clone to get on the witness
stand and claim that he can predict future dangerousness with any degree
223.
224.
225.
226.

Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 138-39 (1997).
See Godsey v. State, 989 S.W.2d 482, 490 (Tex. App. 1999).
U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
FED. R. EVID. 403.
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of certainty. This misleads the jury by presenting pure speculation as
verifiable fact. It is “prejudicial beyond belief,”227 to the defendant
because it unfairly characterizes him as a monster who must be
destroyed.
There is a great deal that is questionable about the way capital
punishment is administered in Texas.228 Since the death penalty was
reinstated in 1976, the state of Texas has carried out over one-third of
the executions in the United States (321 out of 907, as of April 2,
2004).229 There tends to be a carnival atmosphere during Texas
executions: revelers chant death slogans, buy death penalty souvenirs,
drink beer, and cheer outside the place of execution until they are
hoarse.230 As of January 1, 2004, Texas had 458 prisoners on death
row,231 so it appears there will be no end to the festivities. If Texas is so
in love with capital punishment that it must have it, let it base the death
penalty entirely, as other states do, on a defendant’s past, provable
actions. The irony is that Texas would not need its “future
dangerousness” factor to execute murderers such as Barefoot (who killed
a policeman), Jurek, and Nenno (both rapists and murderers of children).
Their crimes would bring on the death penalty under the sentencing
schemes of many other states.232 What is disturbing is that less culpable
defendants may be executed due to the foreordained nature of the
proceedings.233 One study showed that, between 1974 and 1988, Texas
juries voted for the death penalty in 77% of capital murder cases.234 In
Georgia, by contrast, a defendant convicted of capital murder has only
slightly more than a 50-50 chance of getting the death penalty.235 In
Texas, the death penalty is likely to turn on the highly unreliable
testimony of a pro-prosecution witness who is predicting the future.
227. Smith, 534 S.W.2d at 905 (Odom, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
228. See generally, e.g., Newton, supra note 83; TEXAS DEFENDER SERVICE, supra note 88,
available at http://www.texasdefender.org/state%20of%20denial (providing a critique of the Texas
system). But see generally Goldberg, supra note 36 (providing a defense of the Texas system).
229. Death Penalty Information Center website, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?
scid=8&did=186 (last updated April 2, 2004).
230. See Newton, supra note 83, at 4-5.
231. Death Penalty Information Center website, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?
scid=9&did=188#state (as of January 1, 2004).
232. See Simon & Spaulding, supra note 37, at 84.
233. I oppose the death penalty on philosophical, not merely constitutional or practical,
grounds, though this topic is outside the scope of this article. I mention it merely to reveal my bias
and to emphasize that I am not advocating the death penalty; I am merely urging that, where it is
used, the sentencing procedure should be such that the outcome is not predetermined.
234. Sorensen & Marquart, supra note 81, at 769.
235. Arnold Barnett, Some Distribution Patterns for the Georgia Death Sentence, 18 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1327, 1340-41 (1985).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2004

35

Akron Law Review, Vol. 37 [2004], Iss. 3, Art. 2
REGNIER1.DOC

4/26/2004 11:04 AM

504

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[37:469

Use of future dangerousness predictions seems particularly
unnecessary when the choice being made is between the death sentence
and life in prison without parole. Proponents of the current system argue
that inflicting the death penalty on potentially violent criminals protects
other inmates and prison officials from risk of violence.236 But this
theory ignores research showing that murderers are extremely unlikely
to murder again while in prison.237 A study of all homicides in state and
federal prisons in 1973 found that 99.8% of prisoners convicted of
murder do not murder again while in prison.238 If one could reliably
identify the 0.2% of convicted murderers who will murder in prison, one
could save some inmates’ lives; but, as we have seen, there is no reliable
method for determining which murderers will kill again.239 And,
counterintuitive as it may seem, research indicates that, among all
convicted felons, murderers are the best parole risks.240 A study of New
York parolees over a ten-year period showed a much lower recidivism
rate among murderers (7.2% were convicted of the same or a lesser
offense) than among other offenders (20.3% were convicted of similar
offenses).241
VII. RE-THINKING EXPERT TESTIMONY
The ability of future dangerousness testimony to survive seemingly
radical changes in evidentiary policies demonstrates the lack of rigor in
the new approaches. The Daubert/Kumho rule is so flexible that it allows
loopholes which admit even the testimony of a Dr. Grigson, despite his
expulsion from the APA. I sympathize with such commentators as Paul
S. Milich,242 Adina Schwartz,243 and Peter Huber,244 who prefer the Frye
rule, or some improved version of it. The basic insight of Frye, which
requires general acceptance in the scientific community,245 is that there
236. Goldberg & Blum, supra note 36, at 130.
237. Radelet & Marquart, supra note 116, at 855.
238. Wendy Phillips Wolfson, The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty upon Prison Murder,
in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 159, 160 (Hugo Bedau ed., 1982).
239. Id. at 170.
240. Radelet & Marquart, supra note 116, at 854.
241. John Stanton, Murderers on Parole, 15 CRIME & DELINQ. 149, 152 (1969).
242. Paul S. Milich, Controversial Science in the Courtroom: Daubert and the Law’s Hubris,
43 EMORY L. J. 913 (1994).
243. Adina Schwartz, A “Dogma of Empiricism” Revisited: Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and the Need to Resurrect the Philosophical Insight of Frye v. United States,
10 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 149 (1997).
244. Peter Huber, Junk Science in the Courtroom, 22 VAL. U. L. REV. 723, 742-43 (1992).
245. Frye, 293 F. at 1014 (holding that expert testimony based on a scientific principle is
admissible only if the principle is “sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
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is no extra-scientific standpoint from which judges can gauge the
reliability of scientific evidence and that scientists are better prepared to
make this assessment than are judges.246 Schwartz insists that the
reliability of scientific evidence must be decided by scientists, not
technicians.247 In the matter of future dangerousness predictions, this
would mean that experimental psychologists, not clinicians, would make
the reliability assessment.248
But even a re-vamped Frye rule, such as that proposed by
Schwartz,249 would not apply to all expert testimony, only to that which
is considered “scientific.” This loophole allows “technical” knowledge
to fly in below the Daubert or Frye radar, as future dangerousness
testimony did in Nenno. Indeed, in considering the testimony of, say, an
airplane pilot or a real estate appraiser, a test for acceptance in the
scientific community would be out of place, as we do not think of these
professions as scientific. Neither would we expect such witnesses to be
peer reviewed and published. But we should have a right to expect from
them some showing of reliability (the word which summarizes the key
insight of Daubert and Kumho). How would we know if an airplane pilot
has reliable knowledge about flying airplanes? If he has been flying
them for years and has safely taken off and landed thousands of times,
he obviously has some reliable knowledge about flying airplanes. What
about a real estate appraiser? We could compare his appraisals of
different houses to the actual prices at which those houses were sold
within a reasonable time after the appraisals. In Kumho, Justice Breyer
wrote for the Court:
In certain cases, it will be appropriate for the trial judge to ask,
for example, how often an engineering expert’s experiencebased methodology has produced erroneous results, or whether
such a method is generally accepted in the relevant engineering
community. Likewise, it will at times be useful to ask even of a
witness whose expertise is based purely on experience, say, a
perfume tester able to distinguish among 140 odors at a sniff,
whether his preparation is of a kind that others in the field would
recognize as acceptable.250
Even the above examples, however, have ominous pitfalls, in my view. I
particular field in which it belongs”).
246. Schwartz, supra note 243, at 193-96.
247. Id. at 208.
248. See Milich, supra note 242, at 917.
249. Schwartz, supra note 243, at 206-37.
250. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 151.
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am sure the engineering expert will tell us his methodology is flawless
and generally accepted in the engineering community. So let’s not ask
him; let’s ask other members of the engineering community. As for the
perfume tester, no doubt, he will not hesitate to say that others in the
field would recognize his preparation as acceptable; therefore, the query
should not be put to him, but to those “others” in the field—or, even
better, to disinterested observers outside the field who have had a chance
to study and evaluate the methodology.
Putting aside for the moment whether the expertise involved in
future dangerousness predictions is “scientific” or “technical,” how
would we know if these predictions are reliable? We would look at
whether, in the past, such predictions have been borne out by experience.
Reliability must be the common denominator in admitting both scientific
and technical expert testimony.
The Nenno court fudged this issue by substituting the word
“legitimate” for the word “reliable,”251 and deciding that the subject was
legitimate because it had some connection with actual observation.252
That isn’t enough to establish its reliability. Figuring out tests of
reliability for technical experts should be a matter of simple common
sense for judges who are willing to take the responsibility seriously.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The U.S. Supreme Court committed constitutional error in its 1976
decision in Jurek, when it allowed speculations about a defendant’s asyet-unperformed acts to determine whether he would be put to death.
The Court brushed aside any consideration of due process and ignored
its own precedents that held that “death is different.” It compounded the
error in 1983 in Barefoot, when it allowed psychiatrists’ predictions of
future behavior to be admitted even though the psychiatrists had not
personally examined the defendant and even though the psychiatric
profession as a whole rejected such predictions as unacceptably
inaccurate. This ignored the highly misleading and unfairly prejudicial
(see Federal Rule of Evidence 403) nature of the testimony. While
Daubert’s gatekeeping role for judges and demand for reliability as well
as relevance would seem to have raised the standards high enough that
such testimony should be excluded, Daubert left serious loopholes (lack
of guidance regarding nonscientific expert testimony and a too-flexible
test for reliability). As applied in Texas, the future dangerousness
251. Nenno, 970 S.W.2d at 560-61.
252. Id. at 562.
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element of the penalty phase in capital murder cases is a façade that
shields the process’s lack of due process; Texas should adopt a more
honest sentencing procedure, one that gives convicted defendants a
reasonable chance of coming out of it alive. And we still need to re-think
our tests for admissibility of expert testimony, both scientific and
technical. A re-vamped Frye test may be the answer for scientific
testimony, while a more commonsense approach to assessing reliability
may be a solution for determining the admissibility of technical experts’
testimony.
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